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THE LAWYER’S MONOPOLY—WHAT GOES
AND WHAT STAYS
Benjamin H. Barton*
We live in a time of unprecedented changes for American lawyers,
probably the greatest changes since the Great Depression. That period saw
the creation of the lawyer’s monopoly through a series of regulatory
modifications. Will we see the same following the Great Recession?
Formally, no. This Article predicts that formal lawyer regulation in 2023
will look remarkably similar to lawyer regulation in 2013. This is because
lawyer regulators will not want to rock the boat in the profession or in law
schools during a time of roil.
Informally, yes! We are already seeing a combination of computerization,
outsourcing, and nonlawyer practice radically reshape the market for law
from one that centers on individualized, hourly work done for clients to a
market of much cheaper, commoditized legal products. This trend will
accelerate over time. The upshot? Formal lawyer regulation will continue
on with little change, but will cover an ever-shrinking proportion of the
market for legal services.
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INTRODUCTION
My very first law review article was published in 2001.1 The article
contrasted the various economic justifications for lawyer regulation with the
regulations themselves.2 The article reached the then radical conclusion that
we should deregulate the profession altogether, except for the regulations that
dealt with in-court appearances.3 I argued that most lawyer regulation was
self-interested, anticompetitive, and unnecessary for consumer protection,
but that some regulation should remain to protect the courts.4 I used this
paper as my “job talk,” the paper I presented to law schools considering
hiring me as a tenure-track professor. Unsurprisingly, I encountered
significant resistance and faced some tough audiences. In particular, there
was general agreement that, regardless of the merits of my suggestions, there
was no chance they would come to fruition. I was told repeatedly that lawyer
regulators would never pare back their regulatory authority so radically.
Ironically, these critics were half right. Lawyer regulators—meaning state
supreme courts and bar associations—will not consciously cede so much
authority. In fact, half of this Article’s argument is exactly that: in the face
of unprecedented change and roil in the market for legal services, lawyer
regulators will hunker down and change as little as possible.
Unfortunately for lawyer regulators, just twelve short years after my first
law review article called for broad deregulation, the nature of the market for
legal services has changed so radically that my proposed solution is likely to
become the de facto status quo sooner rather than later. Between
computerization, outsourcing, insourcing, and nonlawyer workers, lawyers
will have to share their turf outside of court, and, as a result, the effect of
lawyer regulations will likewise be pared back.
This Article makes five arguments: (1) the market for legal services is
changing radically, and the portion of the market reserved for lawyers is
shrinking; (2) in the face of these radical changes, lawyer regulators will not
want to rock the boat in stormy seas, so the letter of current lawyer regulation
will remain substantially the same; (3) maintaining the status quo in
regulation will actually result in a substantial deregulation of the market for
1. Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of
the Justification for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 429 (2001).
2. See generally id.
3. Id. at 456–63.
4. See generally id.
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legal services as that market continues to transform around lawyer regulators;
(4) lawyer regulation will remain at its most potent for in-court activities and
at its weakest for out-of-court, nonlitigation “legal work”; and (5) this will
work out wonderfully for consumers of legal services.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly describes the changes that
are occurring in the market for legal services. Part II summarizes the current
state of lawyer regulation—who the regulators are and how they have reacted
to the market changes. Part III argues that the regulators are unlikely to
radically change their approach, which will result in a substantial
deregulation of the market for legal services even as lawyers remain heavily
regulated. The Article concludes in Part IV by hedging a bit and describing
some other possible scenarios, including the nuclear option of a large-scale
attempt to enforce prohibitions against the unauthorized practice of law.
I. RADICAL CHANGE FINALLY COMES TO THE LEGAL MARKET
British legal futurist Richard Susskind uses the term “bespoke” to describe
the way lawyers have practiced law for hundreds of years.5 Bespoke was
originally a tailoring term, denoting made-to-order clothes for individuals. It
has since come to be used more broadly to refer to any individualized, custom
service. The private practice of law has largely consisted of individual
lawyers representing individual clients on individual legal matters. Billing is
typically by the hour, or sometimes by the task, but the work itself is
individualized, as opposed to commoditized and sold en masse.
Legal practice has changed in tools (consider computers) and in scope (the
rise of the massive law firm), but not in kind. Law may have changed less
than any other area of the economy over the last 150 years. The same basic
product is being sold and the same basic services (e.g., researching the law,
drafting legal documents, appearing in court) are being performed.
If the last 150 years have taught us anything, however, it is the
relentlessness of technology. In one field of endeavor after another,
mechanization, routinization, and commoditization have replaced
individualized services. The Industrial Revolution brought mass production
to manufacturing. Everything from shoes to clothes to automobiles changed
from individually made to factory produced. Over time, these items grew
cheaper and better, as mass production allowed for advances in quality and
cost. Some bespoke providers remained for the highest-end work, but very
few.6
Lawyers and other professionals who relied on intellect survived (and
thrived) through these changes, as it proved impossible to mechanize
complex, brain-heavy activities like practicing law. The information
revolution and the continuous growth in the power and speed of computers,
however, have started to bring knowledge workers to heel. In multiple areas
5. RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? 36–39 (2008).
6. See Laurel S. Terry, The Legal World Is Flat: Globalization and Its Effect on Lawyers
Practicing in Non-global Law Firms, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 527, 532–47 (2008).
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of the economy, computers now handle work once done on an individualized
basis by highly paid professionals.
The pattern for these changes was set in the Industrial Revolution and
continues today. Bespoke work done by individuals for other individuals on
a custom basis is supplanted by standardized work, and then commoditized,
mass produced, and sold at a much, much lower cost. The total number of
people needed to create the good goes down, as does the average wage earned
by those in the industry. The few at the top who control the process or design
the product, however, make much more than any former provider of bespoke
services ever could. Bespoke services naturally remain for the most
complicated and lucrative work. Over time, however, as alternatives to
expensive work by well-paid humans get better, the share of the market that
is bespoke inevitably shrinks.
The evidence that this process has begun in earnest for lawyers surrounds
us. Computerization, outsourcing, insourcing, and nonlawyer workers are all
replacing traditional legal work. Lawyers practicing law the old-fashioned
way—by the hour, performing individualized work for individual clients—
are being replaced by alternate providers or new business models. We are
only in the initial stages of this revolution, but if the information age’s script
holds true, the rest of the story is not hard to see.
A. Computerization—Overview
The computerization of legal services is occurring across multiple fronts.
As John McGinnis and Russell Pearce’s scholarship establishes, we are in the
very early stages of the computerization of legal services, and what appears
to be state of the art today is likely to seem crude and rudimentary in the near
future.7 Right now, computerization is reaching low-hanging fruit: using
predictive coding and search engines to mechanize electronic discovery or
using the internet and interactive forms to draft simple legal documents.
These relatively basic uses of computing power are already displacing the
work of lawyers, but they are really only the tip of the iceberg. The best, or
perhaps the worst, is yet to come.
Techno-skeptics note that computerization right now is very mechanical
and misses much of the nuance and complexity in legal argumentation.
Skeptics also note that it will be a long time before a computer can actually
simulate the high-level human thinking necessary to practice law.8
Computers do not need to simulate human thinking to handle complicated
mental tasks, however. For example, McGinnis and Pearce discuss two
recent triumphs of computer intelligence: IBM’s Deep Blue defeating chess
grand master Garry Kasparov and IBM’s Watson defeating Jeopardy
7. John O. McGinnis & Russell G. Pearce, The Great Disruption: Machine Intelligence
& Lawyers’ Diminishing Market Power, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. _ (2014).
8. See, e.g., Stuart LaRosa, Why Machines Can’t Replace Lawyers, XEROX BLOGS (June
19,
2012),
http://ediscoverytalk.blogs.xerox.com/2012/06/19/why-machinescan%E2%80%99t-replace-lawyers/.
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champions.9 In both cases, the computers won not because they imitated
human cognition. To the contrary, Big Blue and Watson triumphed by doing
what computers do exceptionally well—performing an avalanche of
calculations on a mass of data very quickly.10
Chess is a complicated game, but it has clear boundaries: a set number of
squares, pieces, and rules for how and where each piece can move.11
Nevertheless, because of the number of possible moves and the length of the
game, there are too many possible moves and outcomes for even the most
powerful current computer to consider every move.12 Likewise, it is very
hard to program a computer to think strategically like a human being.13
Deep Blue circumvented these problems with a mix of chess strategy and
brute computing power.14 In order to determine the best move, Deep Blue
considered many more moves than any human could and also consulted a
database filled with the results of hundreds of thousands of chess games
played by grand masters, and could thus choose a move that had been the
most likely to be successful in the past.15 Thus, a human plays not only a
computer, but also the ghosts of grand masters past. Deep Blue did not defeat
chess masters via superior strategy or tactics; it won by performing so many
calculations so quickly on such a mass of data that humans were eventually
outmatched.16
Jeopardy presented a much messier problem for computers. It requires an
understanding of puns, natural language, and nuance.17 Watson followed the
Deep Blue playbook for defeating humans. It loaded up more data than a
human could memorize and then used a computer capable of searching 200
million pages of text in a second to analyze each Jeopardy answer to find the
suitable response.18 Watson worked from about a terabyte of searchable text,
including the entirety of Wikipedia, a complete dictionary, a complete
thesaurus, the Bible, the Internet Movie Database, and other documents.19
9. McGinnis & Pearce, supra note 7, at [4].
10. Id. at [4–5].
11. NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE 265–92 (2012); Marshall Barin, How Was
IBM’s Watson Computer Able To Answer the Questions on Jeopardy? How Did the
Technology Work? How Might It Be Used?, HOWSTUFFWORKS (Feb. 18, 2011),
http://blogs.howstuffworks.com/2011/02/18/how-was-ibms-watson-computer-able-toanswer-the-questions-on-jeopardy-how-did-the-technology-work-how-might-it-be-used/;
Deep Blue, IBM, http://www-03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/deepblue/ (last
visited Apr. 26, 2014); The Science Behind Watson, IBM, http://www03.ibm.com/innovation/us/watson/the_jeopardy_challenge.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
12. SILVER, supra note 11, at 269.
13. Id. at 273.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 276–85.
16. Id. at 279, 283.
17. David Davidian, IBM Watson Does Not Answer Questions Like Humans, IBM (Feb.
14,
2011),
https://www304.ibm.com/connections/blogs/davidian/entry/ibm_watson_does_not_answer_questions_lik
e_humans18?lang=en_us.
18. Id.
19. Barin, supra note 11.
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For each Jeopardy answer, Watson searched its database using different
algorithms and came to an expected best answer.20 When Watson was sure
enough of an answer (the probability that its answer was correct was high
enough), it rang in and answered.21
Both Deep Blue and Watson triumphed not by beating humans at their own
game, but by doing what computers do well (calculations and searches
through large datasets) very quickly. In law the question is not whether a
computer can accurately imitate the way humans think. Rather, it is whether
brute computing power and speed can allow computers to reach appropriate
answers through different routes. In particular, much legal work consists of
analyzing legal arguments and predicting future outcomes like the range of
results from an ongoing litigation. Insurance companies already use their
vast reservoir of data to set settlement amounts, determine legal strategies,
and choose which cases to litigate and how. Lex Machina, a legal data and
analytics company, claims to do the same for intellectual property
litigation.22 Much of the raw data of legal work (briefs, SEC filings, even
oral arguments) are publicly available and thus potentially available for a
predictive computer dataset.
Further, computers do not necessarily need to be better than humans to
replace humans. Once data is gathered, software is written, and processes
are created, computers are much cheaper than humans. The computer
programs that now handle document review claim to be at least as accurate
as humans. But even if they were less accurate, if they are 10 percent of the
price or lower, computers do not need to be better; they just need to be
acceptable.
B. Computerization’s Many Faces
The most obvious examples of computerization in legal services are online
forms providers like LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer. These companies
provide both blank and interactive forms to online consumers for matters
ranging from entity formation (LLCs, corporations, S-corps), to trademarks,
simple contracts, patents, wills and trusts, bankruptcy, and divorce, among
many others.23
LegalZoom filed an S-1 form with the SEC in 2012 in advance of a
possible initial public offering (IPO).24 The IPO has been shelved for the

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Lex Machina Introduces Legal Analytics To Power Data-Driven IP Business
Strategy, LEX MACHINA (Oct. 29, 2013), https://lexmachina.com/media/press/lex-machinaintroduces-legal-analytics-to-power-data-driven-ip-business-strategy/.
23. See,
e.g.,
Legal
Documents
&
Legal
Forms,
ROCKET
LAW.,
http://www.rocketlawyer.com/legal-documents-forms.rl (last visited Apr. 26, 2014); Our
Products & Services, LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com/products-and-services.html
(last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
24. LegalZoom.com, Inc., Registration Statement (Amendment No. 1 to Form S-1) (June
4,
2012)
[hereinafter
LegalZoom
Form
S-1],
available
at
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time being,25 but the S-1 remains the first widely available public data about
LegalZoom. As one would expect pre-IPO, it tells a rosy tale of growing
revenues and future profits. The overview:
We developed our easy-to-use, online legal platform to make the law more
accessible to small businesses and consumers. Our scalable technology
platform enables the efficient creation of personalized legal documents,
automates our supply chain and fulfillment workflow management, and
provides customer analytics to help us improve our services. For small
businesses and consumers who want legal advice, we offer subscription
legal plans that connect our customers with experienced attorneys who
participate in our legal plan network.
We have served approximately two million customers over the last 10
years. In 2011, nine out of ten of the approximately 34,000 customers who
responded to a survey we provided said they would recommend
LegalZoom to their friends and family.
Our customers placed
approximately 490,000 orders and more than 20 percent of new California
limited liability companies were formed using our online legal platform in
2011. We believe the volume of transactions processed through our online
legal platform creates a scale advantage that deepens our knowledge and
enables us to improve the quality and depth of the services we provide to
our customers.26

This description helps lay out the full scope of the threat to traditional
lawyers. LegalZoom generated 20 percent of the new LLC filings in
California in 2011.27 Some of these customers may not have been able to
afford a lawyer in the first instance, but drafting LLC forms or incorporating
businesses has long been a staple of legal practice. That 20 percent of new
LLC filings in California went to LegalZoom is not a promising sign for
traditional lawyers. Moreover, LegalZoom (and its many competitors) seem
unlikely to stall at only 20 percent of that business.
LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer are for-profit, but there are significant free
sources of legal forms as well. For example, the Legal Services Corporation
has started a website of publicly available free legal forms,28 and some state
court systems have as well.29 Chicago-Kent College of Law has created the
“A2J Author” project, an interactive platform meant to spur the online

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1286139/000104746912006446/a2209713zs1a.htm.
25. Olivia Oran, LegalZoom IPO Delayed, REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2012, 4:40 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/02/legalzoom-idUSL2E8J2EZF20120802.
26. LegalZoom Form S-1, supra note 24, at 1.
27. Id.
28. Fill Out Legal Forms Faster, L. HELP INTERACTIVE, https://lawhelpinteractive.org/
(last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
29. See,
e.g.,
Family
Law
Forms
Index,
M D.
COURTS,
http://mdcourts.gov/family/forms/index.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014); Online Court
Assistance Program, UTAH ST. COURTS, http://www.utcourts.gov/ocap/ (last visited Apr. 26,
2014).
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provision of free legal documents for the poor.30 While these forms are often
aimed at the indigent, anyone with an internet connection and a printer can
examine or use them.
Online forms providers claim that they do not to provide legal advice.31
However, there are lawyer-form hybrids, where the customer fills in the legal
forms and a licensed lawyer “reviews” them. Richard Granat was a pioneer
in this field with his fixed-fee divorces in Maryland at
mdfamilylawyer.com.32 SmartLegalForms offers legal forms and legal
advice by a lawyer in a packaged deal, with an explicit dig at LegalZoom,
calling it a more expensive “non-lawyer document preparation service” and
“the old way” of internet law.33 LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer have
responded by also offering lawyer review of their documents, as well as
discounted deals for actual legal advice.34
Many small firms’ and solo practitioners’ offices are occupying another
middle space, essentially operating as a front for online forms providers. For
example, the National Law Foundation offers “fully-editable form(s)” to
lawyers for “as low as $19,” covering virtually every type of legal drafting.35
Similarly, state bar associations are creating online databases of interactive
forms for use by their members, with an explicit eye towards “competition
from web-based companies like LegalZoom and Rocket Lawyer.”36
There are also websites offering free or very inexpensive legal advice. For
instance, there is the truly free provision of advice in online communities like
MetaFilter.37 The acronyms “IANAL” (“I am not a lawyer”) and
“IAALBNYL” (“I am a lawyer, but not your lawyer”)38 are common
introductions to question-and-answer sessions on legal matters. The advice
30. A2J Author, IIT CHI.-KENT C.L., http://www.kentlaw.iit.edu/institutes-centers/centerfor-access-to-justice-and-technology/a2j-author (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
31. See, e.g., LEGALZOOM, http://www.legalzoom.com (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (stating
under the heading “Disclaimer” that “[w]e are not a law firm or a substitute for an attorney or
law firm. We cannot provide any kind of advice, explanation, opinion, or recommendation
about possible legal rights, remedies, defenses, options, selection of forms or strategies”).
32. Fixed
Fee
Online
Legal
Services,
MDFAMILYLAWYER.COM,
http://www.mdfamilylawyer.com/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
33. SmartLegalForms
vs.
LegalZoom,
SMARTLEGALFORMS,
http://www.smartlegalforms.com/smartlegalforms-vs-legalzoom.html (last visited Apr. 26,
2014).
34. Find an Attorney You Can Trust for Your Family, LEGALZOOM,
http://www.legalzoom.com/attorneys-lawyers/legal-plans/personal.html (last visited Apr. 26,
2014); Get Connected with an on Call Lawyer: Members Save Thousands of Dollars with
Pre-negotiated Rates, ROCKET LAW., http://www.rocketlawyer.com/find-a-lawyer.rl (last
visited Apr. 26, 2014).
35. Practical Forms for Attorneys, NAT’L L. FOUND., http://www.nlfforms.com/ (last
visited Apr. 26, 2014).
36. John G. Locallo, Behind the Technology Curve? The ISBA Can Help, 100 ILL. B.J.
124 (2012).
37. For a great discussion of this site, see Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Facebook
Disruption: How Social Media May Transform Civil Litigation and Facilitate Access to
Justice, 65 ARK. L. REV. 75, 84–85 (2012).
38. IAALBNYL,
METAFILTER
(Dec.
21,
2007,
11:15
AM),
http://metatalk.metafilter.com/15513/IAALBIANYL.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834517

LAWYER'S MONOPOLY - FINAL.DOCX

2014]

WHAT GOES AND WHAT STAYS

9/4/16 8:17 AM

109

is general and informal, but is permanent, searchable, and available to the
public.
Other websites attempt to leverage free legal advice into business for the
lawyers who answer the requests for advice. Avvo is a website that serves as
an attorney evaluation service and offers free legal advice.39 Users post
questions and attorneys answer them publicly.40 Avvo works like “Ask.com”
or other crowdsourcing question-and-answer sites: the answers are stored,
browsable, and searchable.41 Avvo also has listings of lawyers, with a
controversial (at least among lower-ranked lawyers), multifactor rating
system.42 Avvo makes money through advertising on the site and selling
“Avvo Pro,” a subscription service for lawyers to track their Avvo profile.43
Avvo thus leverages its ratings and traffic to draw lawyers into giving free
advice with the hope of gaining paid work. Avvo draws traffic and potential
clients to the site with free advice or ratings.
LawPivot offers more formal and confidential free legal advice. Lawyers
answer specific and detailed questions for free, again with an eye towards
generating business.44 Rocket Lawyer recently acquired LawPivot.45 Rocket
Lawyer has kept LawPivot as a freestanding business, but also plans to adopt
its question-and-answer method on its own site.46
Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) is another source of competition. Colin
Rule directed the eBay and PayPal ODR systems from 2003 to 2011.47 EBay
and PayPal are natural sites for ODR: they have lots of low-dollar
transactions that occur across state and even international lines, making
litigation cost prohibitive or simply impossible.48 The eBay process proved
exceptionally successful, handling up to 60 million disputes per year, and
settling approximately 90 percent of them with no human input on the
company side.49

39. About Us, AVVO, http://www.avvo.com/about_avvo (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.; see also Adam W. Lasker, AVVO Launches Controversial Lawyer Bidding
Service, 101 ILL. BAR J. 68 (2013) (discussing the controversy).
43. Stephen Fairley, Using Avvo To Market Your Law Firm on the Internet, RAINMAKER
BLOG (May 12, 2010), http://www.therainmakerblog.com/2010/05/articles/law-firmmarketing-1/using-avvo-to-market-your-law-firm-on-the-internet/.
44. Leena Rao, Rocket Lawyer Acquires LawPivot To Add a Quora-Like Q&A Platform
to
Online
Legal
Services
Site,
TECH
CRUNCH
(Jan.
14,
2013),
http://techcrunch.com/2013/01/14/rocket-lawyer-acquires-lawpivot-to-add-a-quora-like-qaplatform-to-online-legal-services-site/.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Julia Wilkinson, Colin Rule: From eBay Conflicts to Global Peace Initiatives,
ECOMMERCEBYTES.COM
(June
26,
2011),
http://www.ecommercebytes.com/cab/abu/y211/m06/abu0289/s05.
48. Id.
49. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO PATIENT
REPORTED
DATA
8
(2012),
available
at
http://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/archive/FACA%20Hearings/2012-06-
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Colin Rule and others licensed the eBay software and launched Modria, an
ODR system for hire.50 Modria sells a “fairness engine” that attempts
substantive as well as financial settlement of disputes. It starts with a
“diagnosis module” that gathers relevant information.51 A “negotiation
module” summarizes areas of agreement and disagreement and makes
suggestions for solving the issue.52 If these steps do not result in settlement,
a “mediation module” with a neutral third party begins.53 The final step is
arbitration.54 Modria claims that the “vast majority” of claims are settled in
the first two steps without a human ever becoming involved.55 Nor does
Modria see itself only as a small claims alternative for e-business: it is
targeting bigger-ticket disagreements, as well as complicated issues like
patent disputes.56
Modria regularly notes the expense of in-court litigation and court
backlogs as selling points for its services.57 Online divorce mediation is a
particularly hot area.
Modria and LawMediaLabs have created
DivorceMediationResources.com,58 an online program meant to change
contested divorces into uncontested divorces, i.e., to change divorces from
work for lawyers to work for online retailers.
The model has been so successful that UNCITRAL, the U.N. working
group on international law, has sought to make it industry standard for crossborder e-commerce and business to business disputes.59 Like all of these
technological advances, ODR is radically cheaper than using humans to
resolve disputes, so if it continues to succeed, it will naturally drift up from
lower-value disputes to higher-value ones.
This brief overview of some of the new developments in the market for
computerized legal services establishes that we are still in the early stages of
the revolution, and that there is substantial uncertainty about which
08%20Policy%3A%20Meaningful%20Use%20WG%20Patient%20Generated%20Health%2
0Data%20Hearing/dullabh_testimony_hitpc_060812.pdf.
50. Wilkinson, supra note 47.
51. Our
Modular
Dispute
Resolution
System,
MODRIA,
http://www.modria.com/resolution-center/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also Thomas Claburn, Modria’s Fairness Engine: Justice on Demand,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Nov. 16, 2012, 6:46 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/cloudcomputing/platform/modrias-fairness-engine-justice-on-deman/240142275.
55. About, MODRIA, http://www.modria.com/about/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
56. Eric Johnson, Modria Wants You To Settle Your Workplace Problems (and Even
Patent Disputes) Online, ALL THINGS D (Nov. 24, 2012, 9:00 AM),
http://allthingsd.com/20121124/modria-wants-you-to-settle-your-workplace-problems-andeven-patent-disputes-online/.
57. Humayun Khan, Modria Launches Dispute Resolution Tool To Scale Former eBay
and PayPal Tech, BETAKIT (Nov. 19, 2012), http://betakit.com/modria-launches-disputeresolution-tool-to-scale-former-ebay-and-paypal-tech.
58. DIVORCEMEDIATIONRESOURCES.COM, http://divorcemediationresources.com/ (last
visited Apr. 26, 2014).
59. See Jill Gross, Vikki Rogers on UNCITRAL’s Working Group III on Online Dispute
Resolution, ADR PROF BLOG (July 30, 2012), http://www.indisputably.org/?p=3754.
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approaches will prove successful and lucrative long term. The sheer volume
of the activity and the type of venture capital involved, however, suggests
that technology companies feel confident they can disrupt the current market
and replace expensive human labor with cheaper information technology.
C. Outsourcing
Outsourcing takes two different forms. The first, more obvious form, is
finding cheaper lawyers overseas to do corporate legal work. Pangea3 is a
fast growing “legal process outsourcing” (LPO) firm that employs Englishspeaking and common law–trained lawyers in India to do legal work like
document review or due diligence that used to be done in the United States.60
Pangea3 claims to have grown between 40 and 60 percent per year since its
founding in 2004 and currently employs 850 lawyers.61 Pangea3 was
successful enough to be purchased by legal information giant Thomson
Reuters in 2010.62 As of yet, LPO work has passed muster under state
prohibitions of the unauthorized practice of law because the LPO provider is
working under a licensed lawyer, who is ultimately responsible for the
work.63 Pangea3 has not moved outside of corporate legal work yet, but as
outsourcing proves workable, it seems likely that wills drafted in India for
American jurisdictions will become more prevalent.
Computerized LPO vendors are offering a completely different version of
the product: replacing routine and large-scale discovery and due diligence
work that has previously been done by imperfect humans with powerful
computers. Both the Atlantic and the Wall Street Journal have highlighted
the advantages in accuracy and cost of using computers to do large-scale
discovery work.64 The computer programmers claim that these programs are
radically cheaper and more accurate than humans.65 Using predictive search
and artificial intelligence for e-discovery is the simplest and most basic
60. Niraj Seth & Nathan Koppel, With Times Tight, Even Lawyers Get Outsourced, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 26, 2008, at B1.
61. Anuj Agrawal, In Conversation: Sanjay Kamlani and David Perla, Co-CEO’s of
Pangea3,
B.
&
BENCH
(June
27,
2012,
4:28
PM),
http://barandbench.com/content/conversation-sanjay-kamlani-and-david-perla-co-ceospangea3#.Uxt-K_aV9YA.
62. Ashby Jones, True Believer: Thomson Reuters Betting Big on LPO Boom, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 19, 2010, 9:21 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/11/19/true-believer-withpurchase-thomson-reuters-bets-big-on-lpo-market/.
63. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 (2008)
(discussing lawyers’ obligations when outsourcing legal and nonlegal support services),
available
at
http://www.aapipara.org/File/Main%20Page/ABA%20Outsourcing%20Opinion.pdf.
64. See Joe Palazzolo, Why Hire a Lawyer? Computers Are Cheaper, WALL ST. J., June
18, 2012, at B1; Jordan Weissmann, iLawyer: What Happens When Computers Replace
Attorneys?,
ATLANTIC
(June
19,
2012,
1:31
PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/06/ilawyer-what-happens-whencomputers-replace-attorneys/258688/.
65. Joe Palazzolo, How a Computer Did the Work of Many Lawyers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 17,
2013, 4:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/01/17/how-a-computer-did-the-work-ofmany-lawyers.
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application of computer power. Programmers are already working on
computer generated legal briefs or research memos.66
D. Insourcing
Corporate law departments have grown larger and more powerful. The
general counsel, and not outside counsel, is now the main source of legal
counsel and advice to corporate leadership and is in charge of divvying out
the work.67 The Harvard Business Review (HBR) has noted the change in
the nature and stature of in-house counsel. These offices no longer are staffed
by former big-law generalists, but by a bevy of high-quality specialists,
headed up by a general counsel who is involved at all levels of corporate
decisionmaking.68 The HBR’s upshot? Larger and better in-house counsel
means “a smaller total legal spend (inside plus outside) for the company.”69
This is partially because in-house corporate offices are frequently staffed
with cheaper paralegals to perform routine tasks.70 Likewise, corporations
are increasingly comfortable with computerization and outsourcing,
diverting funds that used to go to large corporate law firms.71
E. Nonlawyers
Cheaper nonlawyers are also starting to horn in on legal work. Professor
Bill Henderson looked at the U.S. Census data for “law office employment”
and compared it to what the Census Bureau calls “all other legal services.”72
Law office employment has actually shrunk since 1998, while all other legal
services have grown 8.5 percent annually and 140 percent over the entire
period.73 The workers in the other legal services category are much cheaper.
The average job in a law office pays $80,000.74 The average other legal
services job pays $46,000.75 There are still many, many more employees in
law offices than in other legal services (1,172,748 versus 23,504), but the
growth and the trend in favor of nonlawyers is clear.76

66. Cf. Eric A. Engle, An Introduction to Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning:
Using xTalk To Model the Alien Tort Claims Act and Torture Victim Protection Act, 11 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 2 (2004).
67. For an excellent discussion of these trends, see THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING
AMERICAN LAWYER 112–23 (2010).
68. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., The Rise of the General Counsel, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 27,
2012, 1:00 PM), http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/09/the_rise_of_the_general_counsel.html.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. William D. Henderson, From Big Law to Lean Law 8 (Ind. Univ. Maurer Sch. of Law,
Working
Paper
No.
271,
2013),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2356330.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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Examples of this growth in practice are settlement mills. In these “law
firms,” a few lawyers sit atop a pyramid of paralegals who do virtually all of
the work. Consider Nora Freeman Engstrom’s outstanding work on
settlement mills.77 She notes ten hallmark features of the settlement mills (in
comparison to more traditional plaintiff’s side practice):
Settlement mills necessarily (1) are high-volume personal injury practices
that (2) engage in aggressive advertising from which they obtain a high
proportion of their clients, (3) epitomize “entrepreneurial legal practices,”
and (4) take few—if any—cases to trial. In addition, settlement mills
generally (5) charge tiered contingency fees; (6) do not engage in rigorous
case screening and thus primarily represent victims with low-dollar claims;
(7) do not prioritize meaningful attorney-client interaction; (8) incentivize
settlements via mandatory quotas or by offering negotiators awards or feebased compensation; (9) resolve cases quickly, usually within two-to-eight
months of the accident; and (10) rarely file lawsuits.78

Plaintiff’s side lawyers carry heavy caseloads, frequently as many as
seventy open files at a time.79 But traditional plaintiff’s attorneys are pikers
in comparison to the settlement mill counterpart: settlement mill attorneys
carry upwards of 200 to 300.80 How is it possible to carry such a high
caseload? Paralegals interview the clients and prepare the settlements with
as little involvement from the lawyers as possible.81 Settlement mills have
thus taken some cases that would have been handled in a bespoke manner by
a lawyer working on a contingency fee and transferred them to nonlawyers.
Immigration law firms likewise tend to be paralegal heavy.82
F. The Upshot
The upshot is that lawyers—from big law firms to solo practitioners—have
started to see a slow bleed of business to nonlawyers. The spate of layoffs at
large law firms and the continued shrinkage in solo practitioner earnings are
all evidence of this process. And unfortunately for lawyers, the process is
just beginning. Information technology improves exponentially as additional
data and computing power becomes available.
The scariest thing about LegalZoom and its kin is not that it is much
cheaper than a live lawyer, but rather that it may soon be cheaper and better.
LegalZoom may eventually do a volume of business that will allow it to
surpass the quality of individualized work. As LegalZoom puts it: “The high
volume of transactions we handle and feedback we receive from customers

77. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805
(2011); see also Nora Freeman Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
1485 (2009) [hereinafter Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill].
78. Engstrom, Run-of-the-Mill, supra note 77, at 1491–92.
79. Id. at 1492.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1493–95.
82. Ann Juergens, Valuing Small Firm and Solo Law Practice: Models for Expanding
Service to Middle-Income Clients, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 80, 103 (2012).
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and government agencies give us a scale advantage that deepens our
knowledge and enables us to further develop additional services to address
our customers’ needs and refine our business processes.”83 The feedback
loop of providing forms, receiving customer and court feedback, and redesign
may allow LegalZoom and others to operate at a level no single human
lawyer can match.
Nevertheless, protections against the unauthorized practice of law (UPL)
mean that at least one realm will remain lawyers only: the in-court practice
of law. This is because UPL is easiest to enforce in court before individual
judges. As long as judges continue to insist that only lawyers may represent
clients in court, litigants will need to proceed pro se or pay for a lawyer.
II. CURRENT LAWYER REGULATION
State supreme courts control lawyer regulation in all fifty states.84 Many
state supreme courts have claimed an exclusive “inherent authority” to
regulate lawyers, barring legislative encroachment.85 The “inherent powers”
doctrine is an outgrowth of the constitutional separation of powers between
the legislative and judicial branches.86 The inherent authority cases hold that
a state constitution’s creation of a judicial branch presupposes certain
uniquely “judicial” powers, including the regulation of lawyers.87
State supreme court inherent authority over lawyer regulation has been
predictably advantageous to lawyers. Courts have used their inherent
authority to create unified bars in multiple states (in these states all licensed
lawyers must belong to the state bar association), to prosecute the
unauthorized practice of law, to adopt the American Bar Association’s
(ABA) Rules of Professional Conduct, and to require bar passage and
attendance at an ABA-accredited law school.88
Generally speaking, state supreme courts have not proven particularly
interested in the nuts and bolts of lawyer regulation. As a result, they have
either formally or informally delegated much of their regulatory authority to
bar associations.89 For example, the ABA drafts the rules of professional
responsibility in the first instance and, in unified bar states, the bar
associations run most aspects of lawyer regulation.90
Thus, American lawyers have a unique claim to self-regulation. All other
professions, from doctors to hairdressers, are regulated in the first instance
83. LegalZoom Form S-1, supra note 24, at 2.
84. BENJAMIN H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM
105 (2011).
85. See Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation—The Role of the
Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 1, 6–16 (1989).
86. See, e.g., In re Nenno, 472 A.2d 815, 819 (Del. 1983) (holding that the Delaware
Supreme Court “alone, has the responsibility for” lawyer regulation and that the “principle is
immutable”).
87. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 22–32 (1986).
88. Id. at 24.
89. BARTON, supra note 84, at 105–59.
90. See id. at 122–26, 154–59.
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by state legislatures. Lawyers, by contrast, are regulated by other lawyers—
the justices of their state supreme courts.
A. The Unauthorized Practice of Law
UPL is prohibited in all fifty states.91 The definition of the “practice of
law” and the levels of enforcement differ from state to state,92 but at a
minimum in no state may a nonlawyer appear in court on behalf of another
party.93 Likewise, nonlawyers may not give “legal advice.” State bars have
long allowed the publication of “forms books” despite the UPL strictures, but
have drawn the line at the provision of advice along with forms.94
Internet forms providers present a hybrid UPL case. A human does not
offer advice along with the forms or fill the forms out for someone else, but
the websites are packed with instructions and suggestions that look a lot like
advice. LegalZoom, for example, sells both blank forms for customers to fill
in themselves, which courts have found to be virtually identical to a
formbook,95 and interactive forms, where the customers answer questions
and LegalZoom builds out the forms.96
Nevertheless, lawyer regulators have yet to launch an all out assault on
computerization. LegalZoom debuted in 2001 and has only faced three real
UPL challenges. The Washington State attorney general investigated
LegalZoom for UPL in 2010. LegalZoom settled by paying $20,000 in costs
and agreeing not to violate Washington law, while continuing to operate in
the state with no changes in its business practices.97 In 2011, a private lawyer
in Missouri filed a class action UPL suit against LegalZoom.98 The case was

91. Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397,
1407 n.53 (2006).
92. Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1981).
93. Derek A. Denckla, Nonlawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of Law: An Overview
of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2581, 2589 (1999). This rule is
relaxed in some administrative settings. See, e.g., Drew A. Swank, Non-attorney Social
Security Disability Representatives and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J.
223, 233 (2012).
94. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Stupica, 300 So. 2d 683, 686 (Fla. 1974) (finding that providing
divorce forms with advice was UPL); State ex rel. Ind. State Bar Ass’n v. Diaz, 838 N.E.2d
433, 448 (Ind. 2005) (finding that providing immigration forms with advice was UPL).
95. See, e.g., Janson v. LegalZoom.com, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1062–63 (W.D. Mo.
2011).
96. Id.
97. Press Release, LegalZoom, LegalZoom Enters into Agreement with State of
Washington
(Sept.
16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.globenewswire.com/newsroom/news.html?d=201745. For the settlement itself,
see Assurance of Discontinuance, In re LegalZoom.com, Inc., 10-2-02053-2 (Super. Ct. Wash.
Sept.
15,
2010),
available
at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/News/Press_Releases/2010/LegalZoomAOD.p
df.
98. Nathan Kopel, Seller of Online Legal Forms Settles Unauthorized Practice of Law
Suit, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 23, 2011, 11:47 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/08/23/seller-ofonline-legal-forms-settles-unauthorized-practiced-of-law-suit/.
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settled before trial when LegalZoom agreed to a small payment and some
unspecified changes in its business practices.99 LegalZoom lost its summary
judgment motion and a Missouri federal district court held that interactive
forms constitute the unauthorized practice of law.100 The CEO of
LegalZoom stated that they settled the suit “with little change in [the]
business, agreeing mainly to pay lawyers’ fees”101 and LegalZoom operates
the same in Missouri as it does in other states.
LegalZoom has actually brought suit against the state bar in North
Carolina, seeking a declaratory judgment that it is not engaging in UPL.102
So far LegalZoom has survived a motion to dismiss, but the district court has
not ruled on the central UPL issue.103
B. Why So Little UPL Activity?
There are several reasons for the relative lack of UPL challenges brought
by lawyer regulators against these new operators. Lawyers have been a little
like a frog in a pot of slowly heating water. They did not notice the threat
that computerized legal services presented until it was too late. At first,
LegalZoom and other internet providers were no competition at all. The
forms themselves were rudimentary and not even jurisdiction specific, and
LegalZoom’s clients likely could not afford a lawyer anyway. This is
especially likely because hiring a lawyer is too expensive for most Americans
to afford.104
As the forms have improved and public acceptance has risen, however,
people who could otherwise afford a lawyer have started using online
providers. For example, a colleague of mine recently decided to update his
will. He called the lawyer who had written the first will ten years ago and
was so stunned by the cost that he built a new will on LegalZoom for roughly
one-tenth the price.
Given LegalZoom’s rise, scrutiny will likely increase.105 Nevertheless, at
this point, LegalZoom is a famous company with a large advertising

99. Id.
100. Janson, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 1064–65.
101. Daniel Fisher, Silicon Valley Sees Gold in Internet Legal Services, FORBES (Oct. 5,
2011, 12:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/10/05/silicon-valley-seesgold-in-internet-legal-services/.
102. Craig Jarvis, Online Legal Firm in Bar Fight, CHARLOTTE NEWS OBSERVER (Oct. 5,
2011), http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/10/05/1540408/online-firm-in-bar-fight.html.
103. Nate Raymond, LegalZoom Lawsuit Against NC Bar May Proceed, THOMPSON
REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.webcitation.org/6EkcXBVa9. For the
order itself, see LegalZoom.com, Inc. v. N.C. State Bar, No. 11 CVS 15111, 2012 WL
3678650 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2012).
104. Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of
the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129 (2010).
105. See, e.g., Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Looking Back and Looking Ahead: Preparing Your
Practice for the Future: Do Not Get Behind the Change Curve, 36 ACTEC J. 1, 19–23 (2010)
(arguing that LegalZoom service is the unauthorized practice of law and describing his
personal, negative experience with LegalZoom).
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budget.106 Any effort to put it out of business in any particular state would
bring significant negative attention to that state’s lawyer regulators. For
example, in the late 1990s, the State Bar of Texas successfully prosecuted an
offline program called “Quicken Family Lawyer” for UPL, only to be briskly
overruled by the Texas legislature.107
Likewise, in the early 2000s, the ABA sought to create a model definition
of the practice of law,108 likely as a precursor to increased UPL enforcement.
The U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission quickly
sent the ABA a comment letter objecting to the proposed definition as
overbroad and anticompetitive.109 Given that the ABA settled an antitrust
investigation over its accreditation of law schools in 1995,110 this letter was
a shot across the bow on UPL.
There is also a broader enforcement problem: even if UPL challenges
could destroy LegalZoom, what about the websites that promise that a lawyer
“reviews” the documentation? These sites are priced competitively with
LegalZoom and are much cheaper than a traditional lawyer, so the problem
would persist even with aggressive UPL enforcement.
In the corporate law arena, UPL challenges are also unlikely to succeed,
because as long as a lawyer supervises the work (i.e., inside counsel or a big
firm), the work has generally not been considered UPL. Lawyer regulators
have also historically left corporate law firms to their own devices: state bar
complaints or investigations are extremely rare, as are UPL prosecutions.111

Comment [A1]: To maintain uniformity throughout the
Symposium, we have used the names as listed on the bar
association’s official website.
EH

III. FORMAL LAWYER REGULATION WILL LIKELY REMAIN
LARGELY THE SAME
In 2008, Rahm Emanuel reminded us that we should never let a crisis go
to waste,112 and proponents of changes in lawyer regulation have taken that

106. See LegalZoom Form S-1, supra note 24, at F-17 (listing $36.4 million as advertising
costs in 2011).
107. Unauthorized Practice of Law Comm. v. Parsons Tech., Inc., 179 F.3d 956, 956 (5th
Cir. 1999) (vacating the district court’s injunction banning Quicken Family Lawyer after the
Texas Legislature amended its unauthorized practice of law statute).
108. See LISH WHITSON, TASK FORCE ON THE MODEL DEFINITION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW,
REPORT
(2003),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/modeldef/taskforce_rpt_803.authcheckdam.pdf.
109. Memorandum from the Dep’t of Justice & the Fed. Trade Comm’n to the Task Force
on the Model Definition of the Practice of Law (Dec. 20, 2002), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/comments/200604.pdf.
110. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and American Bar Association
Resolve Charges That the ABA’s Process for Accrediting Law Schools Was Misused (June
27, 1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1995/0257.pdf.
111. See Symposium, How Should We Regulate Large Law Firms? Is a Law Firm
Disciplinary Rule the Answer?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203 (2002).
112. Gerald F. Seib, In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL ST. J. (NOV. 21, 2008, 12:01
AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122721278056345271.
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advice to heart. There have been increased calls for the slackening of UPL,113
allowing nonlawyers to provide simple legal services,114 and the corporate
ownership of law firms.115 Likewise, Richard Posner, Deborah Rhode, and
others have criticized the utility of the third year of law school.116
Nevertheless, even in the teeth of great change in the legal profession, it
seems likely that lawyer regulators will stand pat. Why? The changes at
hand are so profound, the possible effects of any changes so unclear, the
antipathy of the public towards lawyer self-interest so deep, and the
profession sufficiently divided and demoralized that the regulatory status quo
will appear the safest route.
A. Disruptive Innovations and Market Uncertainty
Clayton Christensen’s book The Innovator’s Dilemma presents a model
for disruptive technologies that readily applies to lawyers.117 Christensen
argues that disruptive technologies tend to come from the lower end of the
market.118 The competitors start by focusing on a segment of the market that
is lower margin, frequently offering a worse product to these customers at
much cheaper prices.119 The producers at the top of the market who are
providing the higher-margin goods are at first unconcerned.120 Why would
they worry about losing the low end of the market when they are dominating
the higher-margin work? At first this strategy actually improves profitability,
as market leaders abandon low-margin work to focus on the most profitable
areas.121 Further, the high-end producers do not want to compete with the

Comment [A2]: In FN: We took out the “1997” from original
book because the source uses 2011, and we thought that the
reader may be confused by what the original 1997 book referred to.

113. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 88 (2004); Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal
Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corporate
Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1692–95 (2008).
114. Laurel A. Rigertas, Stratification of the Legal Profession: A Debate in Need of a
Public Forum, 2012 J. PROF. LAW. 79, 128–29.
115. Stephen Gillers, How To Make Rules for Lawyers: The Professional Responsibility of
the Legal Profession, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 365, 396–97 (2013).
116. See Mitu Gulati et al., The Happy Charade: An Empirical Examination of the Third
Year of Law School, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235 (2001); Deborah Rhode, Legal Education:
Rethinking the Problem, Reimagining the Reforms, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 437 (2013); Richard
Posner, Editorial, Let Employers Insist If Three Years of Law School Is Necessary, L.A. DAILY
J., Dec. 15, 1999, at 6.
117. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: THE REVOLUTIONARY
BOOK THAT WILL CHANGE THE WAY YOU DO BUSINESS (First Harper Bus. Paperback ed. 2011)
[hereinafter CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA]. Christensen has turned the original
book into something of a cottage industry, including new books entitled CLAYTON M.
CHRISTENSEN & CURTIS W. JOHNSON, DISRUPTING CLASS: HOW DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION WILL
CHANGE THE WAY THE WORLD LEARNS (2011); CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & HENRY J.
EYRING, THE INNOVATIVE UNIVERSITY: CHANGING THE DNA OF HIGHER EDUCATION FROM THE
INSIDE OUT (2011); and CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & MICHAEL E. RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S
SOLUTION (2003). Ray W. Campbell applies Christensen’s work more fully to the legal
services market. See Ray W. Campbell, Rethinking Regulation and Innovation in the U.S.
Legal Services Market, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1 (2012).
118. See CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 117, at xviii.
119. Id.
120. Id. at xx.
121. Id.
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low-end producers: the disruptive product is worse, much cheaper, and lower
margin, so competing with the disruptive technology might even cannibalize
more profitable sales.122
But the producers in the lower end of the market eventually master the
low-margin work and gradually work their way up the chain to compete for
the higher-margin work.123 Thus, what appears to be the best strategy short
term turns out to be disastrous long term, as the disruptive technology
eventually captures most or all of the market.124
Established providers tend to double down on what they have always done,
rather than try to compete with the innovative technology.125 Uncertainty
also tends to breed inertia.126 Lastly, it is hard to teach old dogs new tricks.
The legacy industry is expert at one way of doing business, but the disruptive
innovation presents a radically different model.127
The reaction of lawyers to their changed circumstances has been straight
out of this playbook: they ignored computerization at first. Then they
dismissed it. Now they deride it as substandard, but have largely failed to
meet the competition head on. This provides a market opportunity for the
lawyers that have adopted virtual and online law practices. But it presents a
significant challenge to everyone else. Frequently these sorts of challenges
have been met by inertia rather than radical change.
B. The Public Will Not Stand for a UPL Revolution
LegalZoom and other computerized providers of legal services have grown
prevalent and profitable enough to present a strong challenge to any UPL
enforcement effort. Generally speaking, UPL enforcement has been at its
most robust when aimed against individuals. For example, one of the more
notable UPL cases against a computerized form punished the individual who
filled an electronic will form for an elderly neighbor, rather than the form
provider itself.128 Similarly, publishers of legal forms have had more success
fighting UPL than individual nonlawyer scriveners.129 This is because
individuals often lack the funds or political power to defend themselves. So
UPL prosecutions of small legal websites are more likely to proceed and
succeed than any prosecution large enough to slow the current tide.

122. See id.
123. See id. at xviii–xx.
124. See id.
125. See id. at xxiii–xxvi.
126. See id. at xxv.
127. See generally id. at xi–xxxii.
128. Mathew Rotenberg, Note, Stifled Justice: The Unauthorized Practice of Law and
Internet Legal Resources, 97 MINN. L. REV. 709, 709–10 (2012).
129. Catherine J. Lanctot, Scriveners in Cyberspace: Online Document Preparation and
the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811, 822–836 (2002).
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C. Bar Associations and State Supreme Courts
Still Run Lawyer Regulation
The two subsections above explain why a large-scale UPL attack on
nonlawyers and computers is unlikely. This section explains why other
regulatory changes are likely to flounder.
The first reason is that many of the current demands for change are
responses to general, longstanding problems and not a response to the current
challenge to lawyer hegemony. For example, there has been a renewed effort
to push law schools to provide more practical training.130 Nevertheless,
teaching law graduates the basics of actually practicing law has been an
obvious need since law schools and the case method replaced apprenticeships
for lawyer training.131 Graduating practice-ready lawyers might help an
individual school’s students compete in a tough market, but it does nothing
to address the baseline problem: due to changes in the market, there are too
few jobs. It also begs the question of what “practice ready” means in a
radically shifting market.
Second, barring turnover in who regulates law schools (the ABA and state
supreme courts), no large changes are likely to happen in the near term.
Why? Because any large-scale changes would cost a lot of money, reduce
tuition, or increase competition in a crowded market. State supreme courts
and the ABA control admission to the profession and the accreditation of
American law schools. These bodies have proven predictably responsive to
their main constituencies (lawyers and law schools),132 so for any proposed
solution one should ask “would ABA members or law school faculties and
administrators object to this change?” If the answer is yes, the change is
unlikely to occur.
Take the idea of a two-year law school program. Northwestern University
Law School offers a two-year program, but those students pay full tuition and
attend school full-time through two or three summer sessions.133 That twoyear program is just a three-year program squeezed into two full years. A
true two-year program would require fewer credit hours and would be
cheaper and faster. That would result in more law graduates, fewer total
students per year, or both. In short, an ABA-accredited, two-year program
would be a disaster for already struggling law schools and a saturated job
market. Even if state supreme courts and the ABA thought these ideas were

130. See, e.g., ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007);
WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF
LAW (2007).
131. See, e.g., ALFRED Z. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 281
(1921) (“The failure of the modern American law school to make any adequate provision in
its curriculum for practical training constitutes a remarkable educational anomaly.”).
132. I wrote a whole book about this. BARTON, supra note 84.
133. Dan Slater, Law School in 2 Years (Same $$?)—Assessing Northwestern’s Program,
WALL ST. J. (June 20, 2008, 11:06 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/06/20/law-school-in2-years-same-price-assessing-northwesterns-program/.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834517

LAWYER'S MONOPOLY - FINAL.DOCX

2014]

WHAT GOES AND WHAT STAYS

9/4/16 8:17 AM

121

worth pursuing, the opposition from law school deans and the rank and file
would be excruciating.
Likewise, consider the failure of the ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 to
address the prohibition of nonlawyer ownership of law firms. William
Henderson has rightly called the prohibition a “farce” that keeps lawyers
from engaging with the world of nonlegal entities that are entering the
field.134 Nevertheless, bar associations have asked the band to play on as the
ship sinks around them, arguing over ethics rules that only bind a very limited
group of lawyers.135
There has been quite a bit of controversy over a recent ABA Task Force
on the Future of Legal Education report, which called for liberalizing or
eliminating a number of accreditation standards.136 The recommendations
have proven controversial,137 and time will tell if they have much effect when
they reach the broader membership of the ABA.
Similarly, based on the Washington State “limited license legal
technicians”138 (LLLT) program described more fully in Laurel Rigertas’s
paper,139 there is much hope that nonlawyers may finally be able to compete
with lawyers in providing legal services. The Washington program is less
than it appears, however. It does not loosen UPL restrictions. To the
contrary, it attempts to extend regulatory authority to nonlawyers in the field.
In Washington State, nonlawyers will be licensed and allowed to draft
legal instruments in limited areas (at first, just domestic relations) and offer
related advice.140 The LLLTs will not be allowed to appear in court.141 At
first blush, this appears to be a significant and unexpected concession by the
Washington Supreme Court. There have been unsuccessful efforts to loosen
UPL to address access to justice concerns for years. Deborah Rhode led a
very persuasive and successful one-woman charge against UPL in the 1970s
and 1980s.142 In 1995, the ABA Commission on Nonlawyer Practice was
finally persuaded, releasing a report describing the legal work that legal
134. William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 490 (2012).
135. See Ted Schneyer, “Professionalism” As Pathology: The ABA’s Latest Policy Debate
on Nonlawyer Ownership of Law Practice Entities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 75 (2012).
136. See ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education Issues Draft Report on
Proposed Reforms to Pricing, Accrediting and Licensing, A.B.A. NEWS (Sept. 20, 2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-newsarchives/2013/09/aba_task_force_onth.html.
137. See, e.g., Matt Bodie, Notice to All Law Faculty: Read This Report, PRAWFSBLAWG
(Sept. 20, 2013), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/09/notice-to-all-lawfaculty.html.
138. Supreme Court Adopts Limited License Legal Technician Rule, WASH. ST. B. ASS’N,
http://www.wsba.org/News-and-Events/News/Supreme-Court-Adopts-Limited-LicenseLegal-Technician-Rule (last visited Apr. 26, 2014).
139. See generally Laurel A. Rigertas, The Legal Profession’s Monopoly: Failing To
Protect Consumers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. _ (2014).
140. WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28(F).
141. Id. R. 28(G)(3)(a).
142. See Rhode, supra note 92; Ralph C. Cavanagh & Deborah L. Rhode, The
Unauthorized Practice of Law and Pro Se Divorce: An Empirical Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 104
(1976).
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paraprofessionals already safely performed and suggesting that the ABA
reconsider its ethics rules and its description of the unauthorized practice of
law to allow greater freedom.143 The ABA ignored the reports and many
local bar associations ramped up UPL enforcement afterwards.144
So maybe Washington’s action is a significant deregulation? Not so much.
First, the Washington State Bar Association (and not the Supreme Court) will
license and regulate LLLTs in the first instance, making any radical new
competition from nonlawyers unlikely.145 Second, the rules for becoming an
LLLT are quite stringent, including years of school146 and apprenticeship,147
making a flood of new entrants unlikely. Third, in some ways the regulations
are already stricter for LLLTs than lawyers. LLLTs must carry malpractice
insurance, for example.148 Last, the new program is not a loosening of UPL.
To the contrary, it is an attempt to regulate more of the market for legal
services, by essentially regulating paralegals. Thus, the entire program may
be a stalking horse for greater tightening of lawyer control.
IV. A CONCLUSION WITH SOME HEDGING
Hard times can bring bad regulation. The Depression was the last time that
the American legal profession faced an existential threat. State supreme
courts and the ABA responded by ratcheting up entry regulations and heavily
prosecuting UPL.149 If the protectionist approach repeated itself today, it
would reverse much of what I have argued elsewhere is a helpful loosening
of the market for legal services.150
The relevant question is whether bar associations and courts will remain
relatively passive as the market for legal services changes (or collapses)
around them. If the market for lawyers continues to shrink, bar associations
and state supreme courts may want to do something.
An alternative to large-scale changes or aggressive UPL enforcement may
be lower-profile moves like quietly adjusting the bar passage rate downwards
or disaccrediting some law schools. Low-profile tightening seems much
more likely than any loosening or radical changes.
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The likeliest result is that regulations for law schools and lawyers stay
basically the same, but grow less relevant, as everything except for in-court
and other bespoke legal work is swamped by competition from computers,
outsourcing, and nonlawyers. Rather than try to regain lost ground, lawyers
and law schools will try to hold on to what they still have, even as it shrinks
around them. I think of it as a sand castle facing a rising tide: the outer walls
will be lost, but perhaps the citadel can be maintained.
There is the possibility for some targeted deregulation to allow lawyers to
compete more effectively with the explosion of nonlawyer services on the
internet. Right now, regulatory sluggishness is keeping many lawyers on the
sideline while unregulated nonlawyers are rushing in. For example, the ABA
and most state bar associations continue to drag their feet on changes to ABA
Model Rule of Professional Responsibility 5.4, which bars nonlawyer
ownership of law firms and sharing legal fees with nonlawyers.151 As Bill
Henderson has noted, this ban is allowing nonlawyers to provide legal-type
services in multiple guises and with creative financing, while leaving law
firms hamstrung.152 Gillian Hadfield has argued that loosening Rule 5.4
would also greatly increase access to justice, because nonlawyer owners
could leverage economies of scale and logistics to streamline the types of
representation needed by the poor and middle class.153
Regulatory bans on multijurisdictional law practice likewise make it hard
for licensed lawyers to compete on the internet. LegalZoom and Rocket
Lawyer are available in all fifty states. A lawyer-run virtual law practice,
however, must satisfy licensing requirements of each jurisdiction, making a
national virtual law firm competitor a very difficult proposition.154
The alternative—a full-scale attempt to bring nonlawyers, outsourcing,
and computerization to heel via UPL or more aggressive regulation—would
require a great deal of political will and capital from state supreme courts.
Truly aggressive moves would be likely to draw federal antitrust and
congressional attention. If push came to shove, state supreme courts and
lawyer regulators would face a potentially existential crisis: attempting to
maintain their inherent authority to regulate lawyers against an angry
populace and an engaged federal government. It is well beyond the scope of

151. Chris Bonjean, ISBA Submits Resolution Regarding ABA’s Ethics 20/20, ILL. ST. B.
ASS’N (June 20, 2012), http://iln.isba.org/blog/2012/06/20/isba-submits-resolution-regardingabas-ethics-2020.
152. Bill Henderson, Connecting the Dots on the Structural Shift in the Legal Market,
LEGAL
WHITEBOARD
(Aug.
3,
2012),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2012/08/connecting-the-dots-on-thestructural-shift-in-the-legal-market.html.
153. Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice Through the
Corporate Practice of Law (Ctr. in Law, Econ. & Org. Research Paper Series No. C12-16,
Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 12-26, 2012), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2183978.
154. See Stephanie L. Kimbro, Regulatory Barriers to the Growth of Multijurisdictional
Virtual Law Firms and Potential First Steps to Their Removal, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE
165 (2012).
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this Article to determine whether federal supremacy would overrule bedrock
state constitutional law in such a showdown. Simply describing the
parameters of the potential showdown helps explain why lawyer regulators
have and will continue to tread lightly.
The most likely result is little formal change amidst massive informal
changes. This will have a negative impact on the legal profession, which will
need to find new sources of business or will face significant shrinkage. It
will be outstanding news for the public at large. In 2001, I joined a
distinguished chorus of legal scholars—Deborah Rhode, Stephen Gillers, and
David Luban—in calling for large-scale deregulation of the legal profession.
It appears my hopes for massive changes in lawyer regulation will remain
unfulfilled. My hope for a deregulated market for legal services, however, is
coming true before our eyes. Given that much lawyer regulation is
protectionist and not aimed at benefitting the public and that most Americans
cannot afford a lawyer for even relatively basic legal needs, if this
deregulation continues unabated, the broader public will be the beneficiaries.
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